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Thought for the Day: To Charge Or Not To Charge -- The Cost of Unspoken Agreements

My research adviser was not at all careful to use the title "Doctor". He said that in all of his flying and theater going experience, never once had he heard announced, "Is there a physicist in the house? We have an emergency differential equation that needs to be solved!" I can add my 60 plus years of experience to that observation. But if someone did have an emergency and need a differential equation solved (yeah, yeah, and if a frog did have six shooters and a ten gallon hat), would I be able to charge for that service, if no fees were discussed on either side prior to the service being rendered?

First, is this a question that halacha addresses? Answer: Yes, halacha covers all situations; the Torah is timeless. Ah... right... sure... so where does one go to determine the halacha in this situation? We often talk about the "fifth section of shuchan aruch", but it sure ain't הלכות משוואות דיפרנציאליות. Fortunately, this is really easy. It's a money matter, so it is in Choshen Mishpat, and that will lead us back to the third mishna in the first chapter of Bava Metzia. The mishna there discusses appointing someone as an agent to acquire a found object. For example, Bob sees a 100$ bill lying on the sidewalk across the street and asks his acquaintance George to pick up the 100$ bill and acquire it for him.

You might be wondering why Bob doesn't just pick it up himself (maybe he is lazy) and why George doesn't just pick it up for himself (maybe he is not the sharpest tool in the shed). As it turns out, the gemara addresses those questions and more: for example, what happens if it finally dawns on George that he can just pick it up for himself. Spoiler: it depends on when and how publicly George makes that decision. The gemara also discusses whether or not George can charge Bob for the pick up service he has rendered.... finally! our question.

Consider these two cases.
  1. Yehuda (who is not an inn-keeper) learns that Yitzy needs a place for Shabbos. Yehuda invites Yitzy to please join him for Shabbos. Yitzy has a wonderful Friday night, Shabbos day s'uda, and shalosh s'udos. Accommodations are first class all the way. After havdala, Yehuda presents Yitzy with a bill for the meals and accommodations.
  2. Yehuda sees that Yitzi has a large, enclosed courtyard with very little of the real estate being occupied. Yehuda decides to store his sukkah material in the courtyard. After almost a year of sitting there, Yehuda goes immediately after breaking his fast after Yom Kippur to retrieve his sukkah. Yitzi presents Yehuda with a bill for a year (a bit less, actually) of storage.
Before discussing the halacha, please remember that these cases are both where there was no explicit agreement regarding fees and services. If those exist, then they are honored; obviously. When there is no formal agreement, though, halacha gives us guidance. The halacha is: (1) Yitzy will, indeed, need to pay Yehuda's bill for the wonderful Shabbos. (2) Yehuda doesn't owe anything to Yitzy for the year of storage. Perhaps you feel that if anyone owes money to the other, it would be Yehuda to Yitzy. After all, Yehuda just brazenly put his stuff in Yitzy's courtyard without even asking. Yehuda, by the same token, made an offer of meals and accommodations with nary a peep about "fees for services rendered". The K'tzos haChoshen (I am told via a shiur from the Halacha Center) feels your pain and resolves the seeming contradiction by noting that it depends on who initiates the relationship. If the provider initiates with an offer, then he is allowed to charge. If the consumer initiates with using a service, then he cannot later be charged by the provider. Again, in both cases, there was no agreement prior to the bill being delivered.

In explanation of the K'tzos, I would say like this. When someone offers a service, you (as consumer) have no right to brazenly assume it is being offered for free. By accepting the offer, the Torah tells us, you have implicitly agreed to whatever conditions the provider has in mind. The onus is on the consumer to clarify if and what strings may be attached to the offer. On the other hand, the Torah does not expect a Jew to brazenly avail himself of someone else's services for free unless he is completely confident that the provider will concur. (That, in fact, is the basis of requiring an oath for partial admission of debt, while the Torah requires no oath at all if someone completely denies a debt.) The silence of the service provider in this case is considered to be tacit admission to that presumption.

Clarifying the matter ahead of time, of course, is always safest for all parties. Even so, there are always grey areas; that goes part and parcel with an human endeavor. The Torah, though -- being not a human creation -- always provides complete clarity.

Anyone have a differential equation they need solved? Reasonable rates.

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