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Thought for the Day: One Witness is Sufficient Regarding Prohibitions

There is an old canard that women are disrespected, chas v'shalom, by Torah Judaism. That myth, much like the myth that Jews run the world (why, yes, I do mean to compare those who espouse either), is fueled by hate and jealousy. Of course, to make it believable -- as that author of the greatest slaughter of Jews in modern times demonstrated -- one needs to add just a little bit of truth into the big lie. That is, bits of true statements/ideas taken out of context and woven into a false fabric of destructive lies. Am I being too subtle here?

The truth in this case, is that women can not function as kosher witnesses in an official setting that requires two witnesses; such as in court, or at a chuppah, or on a halachically binding legal document. What they neglect to mention, of course, is that two brothers -- even the great Moshe Rabbeinu together with his exalted brother Aaron Kohein Gadol -- are also not valid as witnesses in those same situations. This is clearly not a case of disrespecting anyone. While there is much written about the underlying mussar and philosophical principles being exercised, the bottom line is that this rule is what is fondly known as a גזירת הכתוב/Decree by the Almighty.

Here's another thing: outside that narrow region of official testimony, we don't even need two witnesses. One witness is often perfectly sufficient. There are conditions for qualification: adult of sound mind and generally honest. Notice that gender is not on that list. I want to focus on a subset of situations that is relevant to our daily lives: עד אחד נאמן באיסורין/a single witness is believed in cases involving prohibitions. For example, a woman is believed that she is fit to go to the mikveh. Moreover, one women is believed that her immersion was kosher and that the husband and wife are now permitted to each other. Note well, the transgression of being together when not permitted is in the same category of prohibition as eating bread during Pesach or eating at all on Yom Kippur. That fact alone -- that we trust both the woman herself and the mikveh attendant when the consequences of a mistake are so dire -- should certainly put to rest any thought that Torah Judaism disrespect women.

Why do we believe one witness, even when the consequences are so enormous? There are two Rashi's (on gemara in Chulin) that explain. In one place Rashi says: It is a simple logic; it would literally be impossible to live any reasonable Torah lifestyle any other way. How, after all, do you eat a meal, or a piece of fruit, or even drink a glass of water given to you by another Jew if you couldn't trust a single witness to assure you of its kashrus status? When you start looking at it that way, we see all the more so of the גזירת הכתוב that two witnesses are required is the exceptional case, not the norm. In another place, though, Rashi brings a verse in the Torah. Hmm... if it is a simple logic, why do we need a גזירת הכתוב. And, as demonstrated, it must be true; how else could we live?!

The resolution of this seeming paradox is, as usual, to give additional context. Of course, I have to be able to rely on a single witness, however, that witness must has some basic level of trustability. If he is a known liar, for example, you obviously can't trust him. If I see that he steals in public with no shame, obviously I am not going to believe his word about who owns something. In fact, I probably wouldn't believe him on anything, since he supports himself by being a good liar. What about if he flagrantly and without shame ignores the laws of the country? I am probably not going to believe him about much; I probably don't even want to associate with him.

What about if he flagrantly and without shame violates the Law of Creator, the King of kings? Logically, I shouldn't believe him, either; I shouldn't even want to be associated with him. Therefore the Torah itself gives you right to believe him except in certain situations. (1) If he doesn't "buy into" some mitzvah, then you can't believe him regarding that mitzvah. For example, if he doesn't believe in the mitzvah or eiruv, then you can't trust him to verify or deny the validity of an eiruv. (Note: Not that he doesn't hold by a particular eiruv; but that he doesn't believe in that concept.) (2) He is believed that the status quo is still in place, but not to change that status quo. For example, we can trust him to bring us a glass of water or a kosher steak, but we wouldn't let him pasken on the knife used in kosher slaughter -- which transforms a living animal (and therefore forbidden to be eaten) into a steak ready for the BBQ.

One last thing... This Jew who as lost carte blanche credibility is not only the bank robber and serial murderer, it is also the one who says lashon ha'rah and talks about mundane things during davening (Shulchan Aruch O. Ch. 124:7). Just saying.

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