Skip to main content

Thought for the Day: Nine Lines of Gemara, Three Powerful Lessons in Thinking, Learning, and Teaching

There is a standard line of reasoning in logic known as reductio ad absurdum. It is usually employed when a direct proof would be difficult/impossible and it works as follows: You want to prove that some proposition is true; say, for example, that the there is no smallest, positive, non-zero, rational number. The first step is to consider the opposite; in this case, suppose that there is, in fact, a  smallest, positive, non-zero, rational number; call it x. Next, we formulate some logical implications of our supposition; in our case, divide that smallest, positive, non-zero, rational number by two; call that y. We have posited that x is the smallest, positive, non-zero, rational number, which implies that any other positive, non-zero, rational number -- including y -- is bigger than x. So by assuming that there is, in fact, a smallest, positive, non-zero, rational number, we have shown by logical inference that would mean there is a number that is both half the size and larger than that smallest, positive, non-zero, rational number. That's absurd; which proves that they opposite or our original proposition is false, which means that that that statement we wanted to prove must be true. Simple.

I wanted to do a simple example in gory detail to note two critical factors upon which every proof by reductio ad absurdum stands (or not). First, the conclusion is truly absurd. Second, the original statement and the proposed to be false opposite are truly the only two possibilities. People like to use reductio ad absurdum because it is relatively easy and it lets the one using this technique formally and politely say that anyone who disagrees with him is just being absurd. Very, very, very often, though... neither are true; the conclusion is not actually absurd and the original statement and its proposed to be false opposite are not actually the only two possibilities.

How does one learn things like this? From the gemara, of course; one source: Bava Kamma, 72a.

Here's what you need to know before we start: (1) If someone steals and then slaughters an ox, then is caught and found guilty by Beis Din, then he owes five times the value to the owner. (Four times the value for a sheep.) However, that is only true if the ox still belongs to the owner; if something happened to abolish his ownership, then the thief would only owe the usual double. (2) It is forbidden to slaughter a non-consecrated animal in the courtyard if the Beis HaMikdash. Were one to commit such a heinous crime, then the animal remains are forbidden for any use whatsoever to everyone -- rendering it, for all intents and purposes, ownerless. (3) The mishna on a previous daf stated that a thief who slaughters a stolen (and non-consecrated) animal in the courtyard of the Beis HaMikdash would owe five (four for a sheep) times its value to the owner.

R' Chavivi from Chuzana said to R' Ashi, "Hey! I see a clear inference from the mishna that is true, because if it weren't true, then the animal would already be ownerless ans so the thief would only owe double!" (There are actually two versions of what is, but we don't need that for this discussion.) Rav Huna the son of Rava said, "Your premise is wrong." Rav Ashi then responds, "Don't dismiss question so fast; it is quite reasonable. However, we have no proof, as the mishna may very well be talking about a case where the slaughtering process started outside the courtyard and then finished inside the courtyard."

What just happened? R' Chavivi and Rav Huna were both jumping to a logical inference without really addressing whether or not such a leap was justified. R' Chavivi had a question on what he had learned and immediately began formulating wonderful new insights. Rav Huna agreed in principle, but was dismissive of the question.

Rav Ashi did a few things: (1) He demonstrated that the question was certainly reasonable and should not simply be dismissed. (2) He brought that question to the fore, demonstrating that appreciating the question is actually a part of the process of learning. (3) He demonstrated that the question could be addressed by broadening/deepening the context of the case stated by the mishna.

Rav Ashi at the very least demonstrated that there were more then the two possibilities ( and ) More than that, though, he was leading by example how to take apart a mishna. He was also teaching the need to respect your colleagues enough to take their questions seriously. He was also teaching not to jump to conclusions; spend time with the questions to deepen and broaden your understanding of the entire situation and case.

Nine lines of gemara...

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Thought for the Day: Pizza, Uncrustables, and Stuff -- What Bracha?

Many years ago (in fact, more than two decades ago), I called R' Fuerst from my desk at work as I sat down to lunch.  I had a piece of (quite delicious) homemade pizza for lunch.  I nearly always eat at my desk as I am working (or writing TftD...), so my lunch at work cannot in any way be considered as sitting down to a formal meal; aka קביעת סעודה.  That being the case, I wasn't sure whether to wash, say ha'motzi, and bentch; or was the pizza downgraded to a m'zonos.  He told if it was a snack, then it's m'zonos; if a meal the ha'motzi.  Which what I have always done since then.  I recently found out how/why that works. The Shulchan Aruch, 168:17 discusses פשטיד''א, which is describes as a baked dough with meat or fish or cheese.  In other words: pizza.  Note: while the dough doesn't not need to be baked together with the meat/fish/cheese, it is  required that they dough was baked with the intention of making this concoction. ...

Thought for the Day: What Category of Muktzeh are Our Candles?

As discussed in a recent TftD , a p'sak halacha quite surprising to many, that one may -- even לכתחילה -- decorate a birthday cake with (unlit, obviously) birthday candles on Shabbos. That p'sak is predicated on another p'sak halacha; namely, that our candles are muktzeh because they are a כלי שמלאכתו לאיסור and not  מוקצה מחמת גופו/intrinsically set aside from any use on Shabbos. They point there was that using the candle as a decoration qualifies as a need that allows one to utilize a כלי שמלאכתו לאיסור. Today we will discuss the issue of concluding that our candles are , in fact, a כלי שמלאכתו לאיסור and not מוקצה מחמת גופו. Along the way we'll also (again) how important it is to have personal relationship with your rav/posek, the importance of precision in vocabulary, and how to interpret the Mishna Brura.  Buckle up. After reviewing siman 308 and the Mishna Brura there, I concluded that it should be permissible to use birthday candles to decorate a cake on Sha...

Thought for the Day: אוושא מילתא Debases Yours Shabbos

My granddaughter came home with a list the girls and phone numbers in her first grade class.  It was cute because they had made it an arts and crafts project by pasting the list to piece of construction paper cut out to look like an old desk phone and a receiver attached by a pipe cleaner.  I realized, though, that the cuteness was entirely lost on her.  She, of course, has never seen a desk phone with a receiver.  When they pretend to talk on the phone, it is on any relatively flat, rectangular object they find.  (In fact, her 18 month old brother turns every  relatively flat, rectangular object into a phone and walks around babbling into it.  Not much different than the rest of us, except his train of thought is not interrupted by someone else babbling into his ear.) I was reminded of that when my chavrusa (who has children my grandchildrens age) and I were learning about אוושא מילתא.  It came up because of a quote from the Shulchan Aru...