The gemara (Sanhedrin 71b) discusses the strange case of the בן סורר ומורה/rebellious son. The boy is put to death for gluttonous and drunken behaviors as a youth; but only if this occurs while he is between 13yr/0m and 13y/3m, his parents have similar sounding voices and are of similar physical stature, neither of his parents can be blind, deaf, mute, or have any physical deformities, and the must bring him to the court with warning, and they must both want him to be put to death. Given all that, it is easy to understand that this never actually happened and practically speaking just can't. Chazal tell us that the Torah gives us this mitzvah to give us the reward of learning for its own sake and also to derive philosophical lessons.
For example, Chazal tell us that the בן סורר ומורה is killed now -- while he is innocent -- before he grows older to commit more egregious sins -- which he surely will -- and becomes guilty of capital crimes. There is a lot to say on this, but I would like to address an particularly fundamental that is revealed by comparing and contrasting this to the case of Ishmael being saved when he his mother, Hagar, had cast him under a bush to die in the dessert. In that case (B'reishis 21:17 and Rashi there), the angels complained that Ishmael was being saved from dying of thirst even though his descendants would be torture and kills the Jews with thirst. HaShem asked them, "What is his status right now; innocent or guilty?" The angels answered that he was at this moment in time innocent. HaShem replied, "I judge him according to his present status."
We now have a paradox: once Chazal says a person is judged according to his current deeds, the other according to what he will do. There are many differences between the situations: one is a Jew the other not; one is after the giving of the Torah, the other before; one is an individual, the other the progenitor of an entire nation. All true; nonetheless, the Mizrachi and Gur Aryeh address the paradox as stated: Does a person get judged by their current deeds or by what they are going to do? Each has his own answer, each teaches us a fundamental principle of how a Jewish court operates.
The Mizrachi says that while the בן סורר ומורה has not actually comitted a capital crime, he is surely on the path. Yishmael, on the other hand, may be quite evil and the angels know with certainty what is going to happen, but that future travesty cannot be directly tied to his current actions. This would be similar to a known wild kid in the neighborhood who recklessly plays with baseballs; never looking nor caring where they go. You know with certainty that he will break a window, but you can't charge him for a broken window because of that. On the other hand, suppose you see him about to swat the ball with his bat and you can tell by the swing of the bat and position of the ball that he will hit a certain window. In that case, you could grab that ball before he hits it and charge him for the crime of breaking that window. True, he didn't actually commit the crime, but that crime was an inevitable consequence of his actions at that moment. So too, the Torah tells us the inevitable consequences of the actions of the בן סורר ומורה. Yishmael, on the other hand, certainly was an evildoer destined to do more evil, but nothing specific could be pinned on him at that moment.
The Gur Aryeh takes a different tack completely; and says that the resolution is simply that due process in Jewish/human courts is different than in the heavenly tribunal. The heavenly court always judges completely and only on the current situation. A moment's thought makes it clear why heaven doesn't judge by what's going to happen in the future: there is no time in that world; future/present/past are all laid out. If HaShem were to judge on the future, He could have done that before ever creating the world at all! A Jewish court, on the other hand, rules completely and only by the rules laid out in the Torah. The current actions of the בן סורר ומורה will most certainly lead worse crimes later, which is why the Torah decrees that we execute him now. Essentially we are protecting him (and the world) from his future self. Again: that is why the Torah decrees that we should execute him. We, however, do not execute him for that reason. We execute him because the Torah has decreed a death sentence for those actions. The בן סורר ומורה has earned himself a death sentence by fulfilling the job description; just as a murder earns himself the death sentence by fulfilling that job description.
Underlying both explanations is a crucial point of Torah Judaism: Morality is not a human feeling/sensitivity/evolution by which we -- perish the thought -- judge the Torah. Morality is a divinely decreed system that we learn from the Torah and then use that to judge our own actions.
For example, Chazal tell us that the בן סורר ומורה is killed now -- while he is innocent -- before he grows older to commit more egregious sins -- which he surely will -- and becomes guilty of capital crimes. There is a lot to say on this, but I would like to address an particularly fundamental that is revealed by comparing and contrasting this to the case of Ishmael being saved when he his mother, Hagar, had cast him under a bush to die in the dessert. In that case (B'reishis 21:17 and Rashi there), the angels complained that Ishmael was being saved from dying of thirst even though his descendants would be torture and kills the Jews with thirst. HaShem asked them, "What is his status right now; innocent or guilty?" The angels answered that he was at this moment in time innocent. HaShem replied, "I judge him according to his present status."
We now have a paradox: once Chazal says a person is judged according to his current deeds, the other according to what he will do. There are many differences between the situations: one is a Jew the other not; one is after the giving of the Torah, the other before; one is an individual, the other the progenitor of an entire nation. All true; nonetheless, the Mizrachi and Gur Aryeh address the paradox as stated: Does a person get judged by their current deeds or by what they are going to do? Each has his own answer, each teaches us a fundamental principle of how a Jewish court operates.
The Mizrachi says that while the בן סורר ומורה has not actually comitted a capital crime, he is surely on the path. Yishmael, on the other hand, may be quite evil and the angels know with certainty what is going to happen, but that future travesty cannot be directly tied to his current actions. This would be similar to a known wild kid in the neighborhood who recklessly plays with baseballs; never looking nor caring where they go. You know with certainty that he will break a window, but you can't charge him for a broken window because of that. On the other hand, suppose you see him about to swat the ball with his bat and you can tell by the swing of the bat and position of the ball that he will hit a certain window. In that case, you could grab that ball before he hits it and charge him for the crime of breaking that window. True, he didn't actually commit the crime, but that crime was an inevitable consequence of his actions at that moment. So too, the Torah tells us the inevitable consequences of the actions of the בן סורר ומורה. Yishmael, on the other hand, certainly was an evildoer destined to do more evil, but nothing specific could be pinned on him at that moment.
The Gur Aryeh takes a different tack completely; and says that the resolution is simply that due process in Jewish/human courts is different than in the heavenly tribunal. The heavenly court always judges completely and only on the current situation. A moment's thought makes it clear why heaven doesn't judge by what's going to happen in the future: there is no time in that world; future/present/past are all laid out. If HaShem were to judge on the future, He could have done that before ever creating the world at all! A Jewish court, on the other hand, rules completely and only by the rules laid out in the Torah. The current actions of the בן סורר ומורה will most certainly lead worse crimes later, which is why the Torah decrees that we execute him now. Essentially we are protecting him (and the world) from his future self. Again: that is why the Torah decrees that we should execute him. We, however, do not execute him for that reason. We execute him because the Torah has decreed a death sentence for those actions. The בן סורר ומורה has earned himself a death sentence by fulfilling the job description; just as a murder earns himself the death sentence by fulfilling that job description.
Underlying both explanations is a crucial point of Torah Judaism: Morality is not a human feeling/sensitivity/evolution by which we -- perish the thought -- judge the Torah. Morality is a divinely decreed system that we learn from the Torah and then use that to judge our own actions.
Comments